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I. INTRODUCTION
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov1 and Bell Canada
v. Canada (Attorney General)2 (the “Admin Law Trilogy”), the Supreme Court of
Canada embarked on an ambitious revamp of the Canadian law of judicial review
of administrative decisions. The Court’s lead decision, Vavilov, has broad implications for Canadian public law. Speciﬁcally, in this comment, I explore the Court’s
introduction of an important, new contextual factor to the reasonableness analysis
— that of the impact of an impugned decision on those affected by it, and
particularly, those with existing vulnerabilities.
Other contributions to this volume explore the facts and decisions in the Admin
Law Trilogy as a whole,3 so I need not review them again here. The debate in the
wake of Vavilov has concerned how much of the Court’s pre-trilogy, Dunsmuir4
standard of review framework remains in place, and how much has changed. In
many senses, Vavilov represents simply the next, incremental step in the Court’s
development of deference. For example, while the standard of review of reasonableness was emerging as a “default” after Dunsmuir, Vavilov recognized an
overarching presumption of reasonableness review unless one of two exceptions
prevailed (ﬁrst, where legislation mandates a standard or review or a statutory
appeal, and second, where the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness
applies, as in constitutional decisions).
1

[2019] S.C.J. No. 65, 2019 SCC 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vavilov”].

2

[2019] S.C.J. No. 66, 2019 SCC 66 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell Canada”].

3

See Paul Daly, “Vavilov and the Culture of Justiﬁcation in Contemporary Administrative
Law” and Audrey Macklin, “Seven Out of Nine Legal Experts Agree: Expertise No Longer
Matters (in the Same Way) After Vavilov!”, both in this volume.
4

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Dunsmuir”].
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Some aspects of the standard of review determination, however, were dramatically altered — for example, the Court rejected the long-standing view that
decision-makers were entitled to the same deference whether their decisions were
subject to statutory appeals or judicial review was provided. In Vavilov, the majority
of the Supreme Court held that all statutory appeals (unless a speciﬁc standard of
review was legislated) would henceforth be reviewed on the appellate standard of
correctness for questions of law, and palpable and overriding error for questions of
fact,5 rather than the more deferential standard of reasonableness (see paras. 36-52).
This departure from a series of well-accepted precedents led Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. to write a spirited set of concurring reasons taking issue with this aspect of
the revamped framework of judicial review. Much of the initial commentary on the
Admin Law Trilogy has focused on this debate.6
Given the presumption of reasonableness, however, the bulk of Vavilov addresses
the conceptual framework by which Courts should undertake the reasonableness
analysis. The wide diversity of settings of administrative decision-making continues
to put pressure, both conceptually and practically, on any attempt to superimpose a
single framework on the substantive review of administrative action. The Court’s
emphasis on a contextual approach in Vavilov attempts to account for this diversity.
For the most part, this contextual framework recycles factors that also were
recognized in Dunsmuir and earlier case law.
Another new aspect of the judicial review framework, however, has received
relatively scant attention. For the ﬁrst time, in Vavilov, the Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged that the determination of reasonableness may depend on the impact
of a decision on an affected party. On this point, the majority held,
It is well established that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection
when the decision in question involves the potential for signiﬁcant personal impact
or harm: Baker, at para. 25. However, this principle also has implications for how
a court conducts reasonableness review. Central to the necessity of adequate
justiﬁcation is the perspective of the individual or party over whom authority is
being exercised. Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and
interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reﬂect the stakes.
The principle of responsive justiﬁcation means that if a decision has particularly
harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain
why its decision best reﬂects the legislature’s intention. This includes decisions
with consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood.
Moreover, concerns regarding arbitrariness will generally be more acute in cases
where the consequences of the decision for the affected party are particularly severe
5

As set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, 2002 SCC 33, at para. 8
(S.C.C.).
6

See Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative
Law” (January 15, 2020), Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2020-09, online:
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519681>.
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or harsh, and a failure to grapple with such consequences may well be unreasonable. For example, this Court has held that the Immigration Appeal Division should,
when exercising its equitable jurisdiction to stay a removal order under the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, consider the potential foreign hardship a
deported person would face: Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84.
Many administrative decision makers are entrusted with an extraordinary degree of
power over the lives of ordinary people, including the most vulnerable among us.
The corollary to that power is a heightened responsibility on the part of
administrative decision makers to ensure that their reasons demonstrate that they
have considered the consequences of a decision and that those consequences are
justiﬁed in light of the facts and law.7

In this brief comment, I ﬁrst examine the ways in which the impact of decisions
already has been integrated into the judicial review framework for procedural
fairness. I then turn to this shift in Vavilov and its implications for the judicial review
framework for substantive decision-making.
1.

Fairness and Impact

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s repeated references to the framework for
judicial review in Vavilov, that case dealt with only one aspect of judicial review —
substantive decision-making. In other words, in Vavilov, the Court considered the
scope of courts to review what administrative decision-makers have decided and
how much deference should be afforded the decision-makers.
The framework for judicial review of administrative decisions on substantive
grounds had undergone signiﬁcant evolution since its origins in the 1979 CUPE v.
New Brunswick Liquor Corp. Supreme Court decision.8 While the methodology for
determining deference had evolved, its focus remained on the statutory context of
the decision and the expertise of the decision-maker.
In particular, the standard of review analysis turned instead on other contextual
factors, such as the pragmatic and functional approach set out in Pushpanathan v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),9 among other cases. While the
expertise of the decision-maker made a difference, as well as the statutory backdrop
of the decision, the identity, capacity or vulnerability of the person affected by a
decision appeared to play no role whatsoever in the substantive review of
administrative decisions.10 In short, deference has never before turned on the impact
7

Vavilov, at paras. 133-135 [emphasis added]. See also, Paul Daly, “The Vavilov
Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative Law” (January 15, 2020), Ottawa
Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2020-09, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519681>.

8

[1979] S.C.J. No. 45, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.).

9

[1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.).

10

There have been some exceptions to this rule, where the impact of a decision on an
affected party has been cited as a factor in the substantive review analysis; e.g., Canada v.
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a particular decision might have on an affected party.
The erasure of affected parties from the substantive review analysis under
administrative law was in stark contrast to the express inclusion of affected parties
in the procedural fairness judicial review analysis. As the Supreme Court set out a
generation ago in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),11 the
contextual factors by which a reviewing court determines the degree of fairness
owed by the decision-maker includes “the importance of the decision to the
individuals affected”. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the Court in Baker, held,
A third factor in determining the nature and extent of the duty of fairness owed is
the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected. The more
important the decision is to the lives of those affected and the greater its impact on
that person or those persons, the more stringent the procedural protections that will
be mandated. This was expressed, for example, by Dickson J. (as he then was) in
Kane v. Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
1105, at p. 1113:
A high standard of justice is required when the right to continue in one’s
profession or employment is at stake ... . A disciplinary suspension can have
grave and permanent consequences upon a professional career.
As Sedley J. (now Sedley L.J.) stated in R. v. Higher Education Funding Council,
ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery, [1994] 1 All E.R. 651 (Q.B.), at p. 667:
In the modern state the decisions of administrative bodies can have a more
immediate and profound impact on people’s lives than the decisions of courts,
and public law has since Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, [1964] A.C.
40 been alive to that fact. While the judicial character of a function may
elevate the practical requirements of fairness above what they would otherwise
be, for example by requiring contentious evidence to be given and tested
orally, what makes it “judicial” in this sense is principally the nature of the
issue it has to determine, not the formal status of the deciding body.
The importance of a decision to the individuals affected, therefore, constitutes a
signiﬁcant factor affecting the content of the duty of procedural fairness.12

This aspect of the Baker framework for determining a decision-maker’s duty of
fairness in particular circumstances has been widely applied. As the Federal Court
subsequently put it: “In Baker, the Supreme Court recognized that the more
profound an impact the decision will have on an individual’s life, the more stringent
the procedural safeguards will be.”13
Kabul Farms Inc., [2016] F.C.J. No. 480, 2016 FCA 143 (F.C.A.).
11

[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.).

12

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 25 (S.C.C.).
13
Ola Display Corp. v. Canada (National Research Council), [2013] F.C.J. No. 468,
2013 FC 423, at para. 35 (F.C.).
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For example, in Hillary v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),14
the Federal Court of Appeal relied on the factor in determining a “high” degree of
fairness in an appeal by a permanent resident against removal.
Subsection 167(2) provides speciﬁc content to the right to be represented at a
hearing before the Board. Thus, a failure by the Board to comply with the express
and implied procedural duties imposed by its enabling statute may constitute a
breach of a principle of natural justice. The factors listed in Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras. 21-28,
indicate that the content of the duty of fairness in an appeal to the IAD by a
permanent resident against removal is high. Particularly important in this regard
are: the nature of the individual interest at stake; the broadly judicial nature of the
IAD’s decision-making process; and, in the present case, Mr Hillary’s particular
vulnerability because of his mental illness.15

As Bielby J. of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench observed, sometimes whole
categories of vulnerability could be recognized, relying on the Baker framework:
“When an individual’s employment is at stake, a particularly high standard of justice
is required and the process leading to the decision must adhere to a high standard of
procedural fairness.”16
While this attention to impact and vulnerability has been developed in a number
of cases in the procedural context, there remain several important unanswered
questions in how these ideas will be understood by courts applying the concept of
“heightened responsibility” in the wake of Vavilov.
Exploring the range of such questions lies outside the scope of this brief
comment, but some of the most important include: Should impact and vulnerability
themselves be determined along a spectrum? For example, a decision with mild
impact on someone with signiﬁcant vulnerability may be more harmful than a
decision with more signiﬁcant impact on someone with less vulnerability, but how
are such distinctions to be addressed in the assessment of a decision-maker’s
reasons? Are determinations of vulnerability to be made based on individual
circumstances or can “whole categories” be recognized, as Bielby J. suggests, such
as the vulnerability inherent in all those who are incarcerated, or all those seeking
refugee status, or those living with certain kinds of cognitive disabilities or suffering
from certain illnesses, and so forth?17
14

[2011] F.C.J. No. 184, 2011 FCA 51 (F.C.A.).

15

Hillary v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] F.C.J. No. 184,
2011 FCA 51, at para. 36 (F.C.A.) [emphasis added].
16

Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Caritas Health Group, [2006] A.J. No. 893,
2006 ABQB 550, at para. 25 (Alta. Q.B.).
17
With respect to critical assessments of the processes by which vulnerability is
determined, see for example, Sheila Wildeman, Laura Dunn & Cheluchi Onyemelukwe,
“Incapacity in Canada: Review of Laws and Policies for Research Involving Decisionally
Impaired Adults” (2013) 21 American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 314; Mary Liston,
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Similarly, are there speciﬁc areas of decision-making, where impact on vulnerability can generally be presumed, such as social beneﬁts law, or as discussed below
in relation to Vavilov, decision-making on citizenship? Conversely, are there areas
where impact and vulnerability are unlikely to arise, perhaps in certain international
trade, intellectual property or settings of ﬁnancial regulation?
While cases applying Baker sometimes refer to the vulnerability of a person or
group of people affected by a decision, there is rarely any examination of the scope
or dynamics of vulnerability. In other words, the Court states that a person or group
is vulnerable without examining what makes them so. For example, in V. (W.) v.
Strike, Bell J. stated: “Taking into account the Baker factors and the fact that the
Board deals with a very vulnerable population, I conclude that the duty of
procedural fairness in these circumstances required the Presiding Member to make
speciﬁc inquiries of W.V. as to his intentions when he advised he was leaving to go
to yard.”18
Vulnerability, of course, also can be a diffuse concept. Feminist legal theorist
Martha Fineman, for example, has posited vulnerability as “the primal human
condition”, since all people are susceptible to change and are or may be depending
on others, and therefore at risk of harm.19 For others, vulnerability involves a
speciﬁc set of qualities that makes a person at risk of harm. For example,
“vulnerable persons” are deﬁned by the Immigration and Review Board Guideline
as “individuals whose ability to present their cases before the IRB is severely
impaired. Such persons may include, but would not be limited to, the mentally ill,
minors, the elderly, victims of torture, survivors of genocide and crimes against
humanity, women who have suffered gender-related persecution, and individuals
who have been victims of persecution based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.”20
“Transubstantiation in Canadian Public Law: Processing Substance and Instantiating Process” in John Bell, Mark Elliott, Jason Varuhas & Philip Murray, eds., Public Law
Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 213-42;
and Jen Raso, “The In-Between Space of Administrative Justice: Reconciling Norms at the
Front-Lines of Social Assistance Agencies” in Jason Varuhas & Shona Wilson Stark, eds.,
Frontiers of Public Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019).
18

[2018] O.J. No. 972, 2018 ONSC 1263, at para. 27 (Ont. S.C.J.) [emphasis added].

19

See Martha Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality” (December 13, 2017),
Oslo Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 133-149, Emory Legal Studies Research Paper, at 11, available
at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087441>.
 See also Martha Albertson Fineman, “Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics” in Anna Grear & Martha
Albertson Fineman, eds., Vulnerability: Reﬂections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law
and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2016); Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition” (2008) 20:1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1.
20

See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures
With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB”, s. 2.1, online: <https://irbcisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir08.aspx#a2>.
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Courts have yet to grapple with the scope of vulnerability in substantive judicial
review settings as until Vavilov, there was very little reason to do so. In this sense,
the most signiﬁcant effect of Vavilov may well be to spotlight vulnerability, and the
lived experience of those affected by administrative decisions more generally, in the
reasonableness analysis. Or, put differently, the Court raises a new and far-reaching
question in Vavilov as to whether decision-makers can be reasonable if they have not
turned their mind to the impact of their decisions, and in turn, to the vulnerabilities
of those affected by their decisions.
I turn now to how the signiﬁcance of impact arises in Vavilov, and why this
represents a meaningful shift in Canadian public law.
2.

Impact and Vavilov

As calls to include impact and vulnerability in the standard of review analysis are
not new, it is a fair question to ask why now? Prior to the Admin Law Trilogy, the
Supreme Court announced that it was considering a broader re-examination of the
standard of review framework. As a result, 27 interveners were permitted to make
submissions during the hearing of the Admin Law Trilogy, in addition to the
Supreme Court’s own two appointed amici curiae.21
This array of parties and interveners led to an outpouring of perspectives and
views on judicial review. Some advocated treating certain decision-making contexts
in different ways — so, for example, a different level of scrutiny might apply to
discretionary refugee decisions than economic regulatory ﬁndings (which the
Supreme Court rejected). Others advanced the idea that statutory appeals should be
treated differently than judicial reviews (which the majority of the Supreme Court
adopted). For my part, I returned to the distinction between the relative success of
the Court’s procedural fairness jurisprudence in contrast to the relative struggles of
the substantive review jurisprudence. I raised the possibility that one explanation for
this distinction was that the duty of fairness framework expressly referred to the
impact of a decision on the affected party, while the substantive review framework
did not.
In a blog series marking the 10th anniversary of Dunsmuir, in an entry entitled,
“Dunsmuir – Plus ça change Redux”,22 I observed that public law narratives like the
standard of review framework under Dunsmuir can be problematic where those who
actually make the decisions and those who actually are affected by the decisions are
21
See online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/37748/FM260_AmiciCuriae_Daniel-Jutras-Audrey-Boctor.pdf>.
22

See online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/03/07/dunsmuirplus-ca-change-redux-lorne-sossin/>,
 which in turn summarized an analysis developed in
more detail in Lorne Sossin & Colleen Flood, “The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci’s Legacy and
the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 581. See also Lorne
Sossin, “The Complexity of Coherence: Justice LeBel’s Administrative Law” (2015) 70
S.C.L.R. (2d) 145-64.
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completely missing from the analysis. For example, whether the parties affected by
a statutory decision are vulnerable or powerful, whether repeat players or a one-time
participant, played no role whatsoever in determining or applying the standard of
review in the previous Dunsmuir framework. The abstraction of the standard of
review analysis from the facts and circumstances of actual cases lay at the root of
the Court’s struggles for consistency and coherence. It is this exercise in abstraction
that led Binnie J. in his pointed, concurring reasons in Dunsmuir to decry the “law
office metaphysics”.23
The logic of including the impact on the party and the context of the
decision-maker in the analytic framework for procedural fairness is that the
accountability of executive action under administrative law in a constitutional
democracy is best understood as holistic. This exercise cannot be completed just by
considering statutes and classifying types of decisions. The people involved, and
how a decision may affect their lives, introduces a vital variable into the judicial
review framework.
This more truly holistic approach also has been adopted in other peer jurisdictions. For example, writing for the New Zealand High Court in Wolf v. Minister of
Immigration, Wild J. summed up the applicable framework there as follows:
Whether a reviewing Court considers a decision reasonable and therefore lawful, or
unreasonable and therefore unlawful and invalid, depends on the nature of the
decision: upon who made it; by what process; what the decision involves (ie its
subject matter and the level of policy content in it) and the importance of the
decision to those affected by it, in terms of its potential impact upon, or
consequences for, them.24

This concept also builds on the principle of “anxious scrutiny” as developed in the
U.K., where the importance of a matter has been recognized as leading to a more
rigorous examination by the Court on judicial review.25 The principle is often traced
to the statement by Lord Bridge in the U.K. House of Lords judgment in Budgaycay
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department:
I approach the question raised by the challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision
on the basis of the law stated earlier in this opinion, viz. that the resolution of any
issue of fact and the exercise of any discretion in relation to an application for
asylum as a refugee lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State
subject only to the court’s power of review. The limitations on the scope of that
power are well known and need not be restated here. Within those limitations the
court must, I think, be entitled to subject an administrative decision to the more
rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way ﬂawed, according to the gravity
23

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9, at para. 122 (S.C.C.).

24

[2004] NZAR 414, at para. 47 (H.C.) [emphasis added].

25

See generally, Paul Craig, “Judicial Review and Anxious Scrutiny: Foundations,
Evolution and Application” (March 16, 2015), [2015] Public Law 60, Oxford Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 20/2015, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2595190>.
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of the issue which the decision determines. The most fundamental of all human
rights is the individual’s right to life and when an administrative decision under
challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant’s life at risk, the basis of
the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.26

In the U.K. context, anxious scrutiny has been understood both as a duty on the
original decision-maker and a duty on the court conducting judicial review. This
duty is part of a broader proportionality analysis in the U.K., which also ﬁnds
expression in the Canadian context to constitutional adjudication (especially in
relation to section 1 of the Charter,27 and to the balancing exercise of Charter
values).
Without the ability to talk about how impact and vulnerability might legitimately
affect the rationale for deference, Canadian courts engaged in judicial review prior
to Vavilov sometimes appeared to bend the determination of reasonableness to ﬁt the
necessities and equities of particular cases. In my view, recognizing the complexity
of de facto considerations in a more authentic de jure doctrinal analysis will improve
the administration of justice and ultimately enhance public conﬁdence in the justice
system. The questions, however, is whether Vavilov advances this goal?
My earlier argument envisioned that additional scrutiny or deference may ﬂow
from a consideration of impact on affected parties. This position is in some tension
with the Supreme Court’s view that reasonableness is a single standard of review
rather than a spectrum, a view maintained in Vavilov. The majority of the Court
elided this tension by focusing on a “heightened responsibility” on the part of
decision-makers to justify in their reasons that impact has been considered.28 In
other words, while deference remains static, the degree of justiﬁcation required of
a decision-maker to meet the reasonableness threshold may vary according to the
impact a decision has on an affected party.
At ﬁrst glance, this aspect of Vavilov hardly seems earth-shaking. Not only is it
focused primarily on justiﬁcation (as opposed to deference), but it is the last of seven
contextual factors listed (after “governing statutory scheme”, “other statutory or
common law”, “principles of statutory interpretation”, “evidence before the decisionmaker”, “submissions of the parties” and “past practices and past decisions”) in a
category of contextual factors to be considered in a holistic reasonableness analysis.
These factors are not even exhaustive. The majority in Vavilov clariﬁed:
It is unnecessary to catalogue all of the legal or factual considerations that could
constrain an administrative decision maker in a particular case. However, in the
sections that follow, we discuss a number of elements that will generally be relevant
in evaluating whether a given decision is reasonable, namely the governing
26

[1987] A.C. 514, at 531 (H.L.).

27

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
28

Vavilov, at para. 135.
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statutory scheme; other relevant statutory or common law; the principles of
statutory interpretation; the evidence before the decision maker and facts of which
the decision maker may take notice; the submissions of the parties; the past
practices and decisions of the administrative body; and the potential impact of the
decision on the individual to whom it applies. These elements are not a checklist for
conducting reasonableness review, and they may vary in signiﬁcance depending on
the context. They are offered merely to highlight some elements of the surrounding
context that can cause a reviewing court to lose conﬁdence in the outcome reached.
A reviewing court may ﬁnd that a decision is unreasonable when examined against
these contextual considerations. These elements necessarily interact with one
another: for example, a reasonable penalty for professional misconduct in a given
case must be justiﬁed both with respect to the types of penalties prescribed by the
relevant legislation and with respect to the nature of the underlying misconduct.29

Applied to the facts and circumstances of Vavilov, the majority highlighted that
the impact of the citizenship determination for Mr. Vavilov was signiﬁcant. The
majority described the effect of a revocation of citizenship as “a kind of political
death”.30 The majority held that the Registrar’s failure to justify her decision with
respect to the serious impact of the decision on Mr. Vavilov, together with the other
concerns with the application of the relevant legislation and jurisprudence, justiﬁed
a ﬁnding that the denial of citizenship to Mr. Vavilov was unreasonable. The
majority observed that the factors leading to the ﬁnding of unreasonableness,
including the impact of the decision on Mr. Vavilov, should not be viewed in
isolation: “Multiple legal and factual constraints may bear on a given administrative
decision, and these constraints may interact with one another. In some cases, a
failure to justify the decision against any one relevant constraint may be sufficient
to cause the reviewing court to lose conﬁdence in the reasonableness of the
decision.”31
Since Vavilov, several lower court cases have examined many aspects of the new
framework.32 The contextual factor on the impact of the decision on affected parties,
however, has yet to be examined or applied in depth.
In Dhaliwal v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), Norris J.
included this reference in his justiﬁcations for ﬁnding grounds to grant a stay against
the removal of a person who remained in Canada without status after the expiry of
his study permit:
29

Vavilov, at paras. 106-107 [emphasis added].

30

Vavilov, at para. 193, citing A. Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have
Rights and the Production of the Alien” (2014) 40 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 7-8.
31

Vavilov, at para. 194.

32

For discussion, see Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian
Administrative Law” (March 2020), Paul Daly, Administrative Law Matters (blog), online:
<https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/01/16/new-paper-the-vavilov-frameworkand-the-future-of-canadian-administrative-law/>.
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AND UPON considering that the reviewing court will also be guided by the
principle that “[c]entral to the necessity of adequate justiﬁcation is the perspective
of the individual or party over whom authority is being exercised. Where the impact
of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided
to that individual must reﬂect the stakes” (Vavilov at para 133). Given the authority
granted to the Inland Enforcement Offıcer and the signiﬁcant implications for the
applicant ﬂowing from a denial of his request for a deferral, there is a “heightened
responsibility” on the part of the Offıcer to ensure that the reasons given
“demonstrate that they have considered the consequences of a decision and that
those consequences are justiﬁed in light of the facts and law” (Vavilov at para
135);33

In Thangeswaran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
Ahmed J. referenced this passage from Vavilov in outlining the applicable standard
of reasonableness to a judicial review of a humanitarian and compassionate
determination.34 Justice Ahmed found the decision unreasonable in relation to its
treatment of certain medical evidence.
A similar conclusion followed Gascon J.’s analysis of the treatment of new
evidence in a refugee determination in Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration):
An administrative decision maker has a responsibility “to justify to the affected
party, in a manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis on which it arrived
at a particular conclusion” (Vavilov at para 96). A decision will not be reasonable
if the reasons read in conjunction with the record do not make it possible to
understand the decision maker’s reasoning on a critical point (Vavilov at para 103).
This is especially true where a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the
affected individual, such as “decisions with consequences that threaten an
individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood” (Vavilov at para 133). Here, the
consequences of refusing the new evidence are particularly severe and harsh for
Mr. Khan and his refugee claim, and such a situation called for the RAD to “explain
why [his] decision best reﬂects the legislature’s intention” and the case law on the
relevance factor (Vavilov at para 133). I ﬁnd that, in the particular circumstances of
this case, the RAD has not done so. To echo the language of the Supreme Court in
Vavilov, the omitted aspects of the analysis on the refusal of Mr. Khan’s new
evidence causes me “to lose conﬁdence in the outcome reached” by the RAD
(Vavilov at para 122; Canada Post at paras 52-53).35

Other decisions in this early phase of applying Vavilov follow a similar pattern.
Once a ﬂaw affecting the reasonableness of the decision is identiﬁed, the impact on
the affected party is cited as a factor further justifying the conclusion that the reasons
33

2020 CanLII 7806 [emphasis added].

34

[2020] F.C.J. No. 126, 2020 FC 91, at para. 37 (F.C.).
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[2020] F.C.J. No. 413, 2020 FC 438, at para. 37 (F.C.) [emphasis added].
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were inadequate, and therefore that the decision was unreasonable.36 What has yet
to emerge is a decision where the outcome of a reasonableness analysis itself is
determined by the “heightened responsibility” on decision-makers to justify that the
impact of the decision on affected parties has been considered appropriately.
What are some of the scenarios that could arise where the impact of the decision
on the parties affected by the decision could make a material difference to the
outcome of a judicial review? At least to begin with, it may make sense to look to
where procedural justice requirements have been heightened as a result of
vulnerability under the case law applying Baker (for example, the reference to
mental health issues in Hillary, discussed above).37 In other words, a decisionmaker applying the same statutory provision in two different cases — one involving
an applicant with no existing vulnerabilities, where the outcome will be of minor
consequence, and a second one involving a vulnerable applicant, where the outcome
will be severe harm — will have a heightened responsibility to demonstrate that the
vulnerability of the second applicant, and the severe consequences for that applicant,
have been expressly considered by the decision-maker. On this view of Vavilov, the
same set of reasons could be found to meet the reasonableness threshold in the
context of the sophisticated party and to be unreasonable in the context of second
applicant’s vulnerabilities.
Beyond the context of vulnerability, the majority in Vavilov also opens the door
to the relevance of impact in the analysis of reasonableness more broadly. As set out
above, the majority referred to a “principle of responsive justiﬁcation” that arises
where there has been “particularly harsh consequences for affected individuals”. The
Court stated that this include “decisions with consequences that threaten an
individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood”.
Courts have only begun to explore impact in this broader sense. For instance, in
Coldwater First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General),38 the Federal Court of
Appeal referenced this aspect of Vavilov to emphasize the impact of the duty to
consult to the “long-term relationships” between Indigenous Peoples and the Crown.
The Court concludes that, “This affects the extent and quality of the reasons that the
Governor in Council is expected to provide in support of its decision.”39 The
implications of this approach could be signiﬁcant for a host of decisions affecting
such relationships, though for the moment, this linkage remains vague. While the
scope of “responsive justiﬁcation” is potentially vast, its applicability is clearest, and
36

See also Alsaloussi v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] F.C.J. No. 405, 2020 FC 364,
at para. 79 (F.C.).
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See note 14 above. See also Clarke v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2018]
F.C.J. No. 251, 2018 FC 267, at para. 11 (F.C.).
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I would suggest, most relevant, where the impact at issue affects people with
existing vulnerabilities.
II. CONCLUSION
In Vavilov, the Supreme Court has undertaken a signiﬁcant renovation of
Canada’s judicial review framework. This new framework may well allay some of
the concerns with the standard of review jurisprudence and clarify the methodology
of the reasonableness analysis.
In my view, however, for the reasons set out above, Vavilov may well come to be
remembered most for something entirely different; that is, the inclusion, for the ﬁrst
time, of the impact on those affected by administrative decisions as an express
element of the reasonableness analysis. The focus on impact, in turn, may well lead
to a more considered and coherent approach to vulnerability in Canadian administrative law. In this way, the focus of substantive review will no longer be solely on
the legislation and executive decision-makers alone, but ﬁnally on the lived
experience of those people affected by decisions too.
The examination of impact, in this sense, may well be the lasting impact of
Vavilov.
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